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Abstract 
In 1934, Nepal experienced one of its worst earthquakes in its modern history leaving behind 
large-scale damages in urban and rural areas and killing more than 4500 people in the 
Kathmandu valley. Since this event, the Nepalese people are aware of the tremendous risks of 
natural catastrophes. Today, Nepal is ranked as one of the most disaster-prone countries 
worldwide. Nevertheless, 81 years later it seems that the Himalayan nation was once again 
caught by absolute surprise. On Saturday, 25 April 2015, being obviously insufficiently 
prepared, the country suffered from an earthquake of enormous magnitude, leaving behind in 
destroyed infrastructures in several parts of the country, homes and historic buildings and 
many thousands of dead people. To make things worse, a series of heavy aftershocks have 
continued to shake Nepal, causing even more damage and havoc to the remote and 
increasingly isolated mountainous country. This is raises some serious questions. For many 
years now, experts have been warning about Nepal’s vulnerability to earthquakes, stating that 
the latest disaster was not ‘unexpected’, but rather just a matter of time. Subsequently, many 
critics are asking why the country was not better prepared. The most common response to this 
conundrum is to explain the deficiency in disaster management capabilities within Nepal’s 
relentless political instability. Having this in mind, observers are wondering if the earthquake 
might change the unfortunate political patterns. In other words, will such a national 
catastrophe help to solve the political stalemate in the country or will it make bad things 
worse? In this context, domestic and international analysts are focusing their attention on the 
potential impacts of the temblor on Nepal’s internal security, the peace process and national 
reconciliation, especially whether the country might witness another armed Maoist 
insurgency. However, this article points out that the most important challenge is to develop 
and implement a transparent and fair mechanism for the distribution of international aid. It 
will be argued that this is sine qua non for a peaceful and sustainable recovery, and the 
reconstruction of Nepal. Therefore, this publication should be understood as an attempt to 
map the contemporary and future political scenarios determined by the most significant and 
historically rooted factors in the aftermath of the earthquake.  
 
Introduction: Nepal – Inauspicious trajectories in an unusual challenging context 
The political history of Nepal is not only chequered, but also truncated. Starting as a multi-
party democracy in 1951, the country’s development during the following decades had been 
marked by several interruptions, making the state oscillate between absolute monarchy and 
democratic governance. Despite the armed revolution against the pre-1951 autocratic regime 
                                                                                                                                                                         FOCUS                                                                                                  
 
 
of the Rana dynasty (the Rana’s controlled Nepal between 1846 and 1950 supported by the 
British colonial rule in India) and the increasing political awareness and movements among 
the country’s people, no substantial and sustainable efforts were made to transform Nepal into 
a democracy worth the name. However, despite  various monarchical backslashes, due to the 
tremendous growth in people’s movements (Jana Andolan I & II) and an armed Maoist 
upheaval, the reactionary, pro-royalist circles were forced several times to bring the country 
back into the democratic fold. The most important features of these processes are the 
following. Firstly, the historic tripartite power structure of Nepal’s politics - monarchy, 
established political elites (foremost Nepali Congress), and Maoist movement - gradually 
transformed into a bipolar political decision-making system (reduced to two aversive poles: 
traditional political establishment versus Maoists). Secondly, the royal coup in 2005 marks 
the watershed in this development, not only constituting the last attempt of the king to restore 
the old order, but also establishing the rise of a new political force in Nepal, with an active 
civil society as the leading change-agent in the political landscape. In this context, it is 
important to note that in the previous years, cunning monarchs were always able to use the 
selfish interests of the party’s political elites and the party infighting caused by personal 
rivalries. Subsequently, the king was persistently in the position to persistently undermine the 
establishment of a democratic system and to turn the country into an autocratic monarchy 
again in which political parties and activities were banned.  
 
Nonetheless, despite all the political turbulences, in 1990 a new constitution was introduced 
providing political and social equality for every Nepali, regardless of particular distinction or 
origin. However, the political reality was quite different. The way how the power was 
structured in the political system of Nepal, still only served the small but influential political 
elites, especially those linked with the ‘royalist network’, and not the general public at large. 
In this context, we can state that the ruling establishment focused more on individual interests 
and engaged in power politics for its political survival, than on serving the demands of the 
Nepali people. Furthermore, the decision-making power and the access and distribution of 
national resources were not at all representative of the social and ethnic diversity and 
complexity of the country. As a result, emerging protests and criticism were suppressed, while 
becoming increasingly rooted in the life and the awareness of the entire society and waiting 
for the next occasion to create public and political disturbances. The disillusionment with 
Nepal’s political system and its development as well as the plight of Nepal’s disadvantaged 
and marginalised social groups found its expression in the launch of the Jana Yuddha, the 
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People’s War, by the Maoists in 1996. Aimed at toppling the monarchy, this ‘communist 
movement’ was initially a low-intensity, mainly rural campaign, but claimed non-debatable 
adherence to an anti-revisionist Marxist-Leninist ideology of peasant-led armed revolution. 
Since then, the Nepali Maoists have grown into one of the South Asia’s most powerful rebel 
groups. However, the scenario changed in October 2003, after the US government blacklisted 
the CPN-M as a terrorist organisation, freezing the Maoists’ assets and barring their financial 
transactions. Furthermore, the US and several other countries offered additional military 
assistance and development aid to combat this ‘new terrorist threat’ in the Himalayas. Among 
several other factors, it helped to create a military stalemate in the Himalayan country. While 
the regular Nepalese Army was not able to push back the Maoist insurgents despite the 
massive support from abroad, the Maoist militia, also known as People’s Liberation Army of 
Nepal (PLA), did not succeed in seizing the power in Nepal’s political centre. After at least 
ten years of fighting, the combatants finally started to take stock of the disastrous 
consequences of the civil war. The human and economic losses of the insurgency were 
tremendously high. The civil war cost the country approximately 15,000 to 20,000 lives, 
large-scale damages to the infrastructure, while investors lost confidence and tourism 
diminished as the main source of income. On top of this, the Maoists frequently declared 
general strikes, so called bandhs, paralysing what was left in terms of economic activities 
during that time. Being aware of the military standoff and the social and economic cost of the 
war, there was a growing conviction to form a new alliance with former s to combat the 
monarch as he represented the real common enemy. In consequence, while a peace agreement 
was signed in 2006, the Maoist insurgency came to an end, and the monarchy was abolished 
in favour of the re-introduction of multi-party democracy. But like in the early 1990s, the 
political situation neither improved nor stabilised. The dysfunctional political system 
continued to be featured by serious intra-party and inter-party conflicts, lack of inner party 
democracy combined with the inability to accommodate and articulate the interests of the 
people, and widespread (state) corruption. In result, the highly fractious politicians have been 
unable to come to an agreement on a new constitution. The latter must be seen as an absolute, 
essential condition for the stabilisation of the political system and its institutional-
administrative structure. In sum, the end of the civil war, in combination with the end of the 
monarchy were doubtless two of the most critical junctures since Nepal’s foundation in the 
late 18th century. Nonetheless, politicians and their respective political parties gambled away 
the potential peace dividend beneficial for a constitutional consensus. Today, after witnessing 
one of the greatest national disasters in the country’s history, we have to evaluate if Nepal’s 
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divisive political camps and their leadership are trying to regain lost ground in trust and 
credibility by working together for a common cause: rebuilding the socio-economic 
foundations for development and setting the institutional framework for democratic transition 
in Nepal. Having this in mind, one of the first steps is to pose the question: Why wasn’t Nepal 
equipped to deal with the inevitable earthquake? 
 
Assessing the linkage between political instability and disaster preparedness in Nepal 
Most of the challenges and unfortunate trajectories in Nepal are not limited only to this 
country. Most of Kathmandu’s road-blocs hindering improvement of its social, economic and 
political conditions can be found in other South Asian countries as well. However, it seems 
that the Himalayan state and its society illustrate all kinds of possible fault lines hampering 
sustainable development: relentless political instability, bureaucratic dysfunctionality, 
rampant corruption, traditional nepotism, high population density, massive poverty, deeply 
entrenched fatalism, weak infrastructure, and an unusual challenging mountainous terrain. 
Furthermore, unrestricted political struggle within the highly polarised political parties and 
their factions, ethnic feuds, and a decade long civil war have severely weakened the capacities 
of any government to be fully functional and to deliver good governance. In consequence, 
Nepal as the most disaster-prone country in the world is still hampered by a ramshackle 
institutional infrastructure for the management of natural catastrophes and an incoherent 
policy approach for disaster preparedness. 
 
If one believes most of the international and domestic political observers, the major reason for 
the currently flawed crisis management is the ongoing political and constitutional crisis in 
Nepal. But it would be a false interpretation to blame only political instability for deficient 
disaster preparedness. Of course, it is a crucial factor but one must also take into account the 
low level of economic development, the very limited financial resources as well as the 
extremely difficult terrain. Actually, when the earthquake hit the country, Nepal was just 
beginning to experience some kind of basic political normalisation and progress in economic 
recovering after years of armed conflict and political stalemate. In fact, the political elite in 
Kathmandu did remarkably better to stabilise the country compared to the decades before the 
end of the civil war in 2006. Doubtless, the deep political crisis and the perceived lack of 
leadership are not only hampering the decision-making and implementation processes 
regarding a coherent disaster management policy but they are also creating frustration and a 
fatalistic mindset among the country’s civil servants. The latter phenomena had limited the 
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enthusiasm for adequate preparedness and slowed down rescue and relief efforts of the 
civilian bureaucracy. Nevertheless, despite political instability, shortages in resources, and 
scepticism about a realistic opportunity to carry out efficient long-term disaster planning in 
order to be prepared for major earthquakes, the country’s government was finally starting to 
take some first concrete steps. For example, in 2009 a ‘National Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Management’ was developed, the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was formed, 
and the National Planning Commission was instructed to integrate disaster reduction risk 
management into its overall development strategy to prepare for future catastrophes. Also a 
National Coordination Centre was set up with numerous functionaries in order to cope 
immediately with calamities. However, although whatever was done was a move in the right 
direction it was obviously too little, too late. Therefore, it does not come by surprise that 
many observers are increasingly worried about further political instability and the deepening 
of socio-economic cleavages in the context of Nepal’s rebuilding and redevelopment. 
 
Prospects for stability, recovery and reconstruction 
It seems that Nepal is slowly getting out of its state of shock. Beginning with the parts which 
are less affected by the earthquake and are now gradually finding their way back to some 
‘routine and business as usual’. Of course, the current situation and the insufficient disaster 
management are significantly raising anger among the affected people. However, the major 
threat for the stability, peace, and security in the country lies in the long-term process of 
reconstruction, especially when it comes to the distribution of international assistance. In this 
context, the current inadequate governmental disaster management and subsequent rising 
enragement among many of the earthquake victims will deepen the already existing socio-
political cleavages within Nepal’s fractured society, but they will not be the only sole 
responsible for severe socio-political upheavals, like the Jana Andolan movements or another 
armed insurgency. Having said this, now the most pressuring issue is how to find an adequate 
mechanism to distribute the funds allocated for long-term reconstruction. There is already 
much criticism and growing frustration about irregularities regarding the distribution of aid at 
this very moment.  
But Nepal is not the only country facing these kinds of problems regarding how respective 
local governments deal with international disaster relief programs. Making a comparison 
between Sri Lanka and Nepal might be discouraging but it can provide important lessons on 
what can go wrong if aid distribution is guided by a political agenda. More concretely, the 
failure of the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), which was 
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supposed to establish a joint mechanism (between the hostile Singhalese government and the 
Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam/LTTE) to distribute international assistance after the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of 2004, shows that partisan interests and political aversion in the context of 
disasters management in post-conflict scenarios can spark again latent armed conflicts. On top 
of this, the discontent over aid distribution helped to bring the autocratic government of 
Mahinda Rajapaksa to power in 2005. Therefore, the case of Sri Lanka stresses the non-
debatable significance of establishing a transparent and fair system for the coordination of 
large-scale international financial and technical assistance. Having this in mind, the latest 
decision by the Nepalese government to set up the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund in 
order to centralise and control the flow of international aid might be a good way of disbursing 
large sums from multiple donors from an administrative perspective but it does not take into 
account the sensitivities and fears of the opposition. Looking at the long history of 
institutional dysfunctionality, patronage, and corruption within Nepal’s administrative-
political system, a government-controlled distribution system will neither be in the interest of 
international donors’, nor in the opposition’s, nor in large segments of civil society’s. In 
consequence, the current procedures of aid distribution might have severe negative impacts on 
the long-term stability and reconstruction of the country. Nevertheless, each assessment of 
possible future scenarios must take into account that the earthquake could also develop 
positive ramifications helping to break the path of the miserable political culture and 
processes. 
 
Nepal’s unfortunate political patterns: The Earthquake as a potential ‘game changer’ 
Ultimately, there have been examples where dramatic, extraordinary catastrophes have shaken 
up entire societies, common people and elites, to such a large extent that they can help solve 
problems that appeared intractable. Also in Nepal, after experiencing a natural disaster of such 
magnitude, there is reason to hope that the country’s elite will finally be willing to learn the 
lessons from the past and to break with the unfortunate entrenched political patterns, which 
brought the country from one crisis into another. Therefore, some fundamental prerequisites 
are required. Besides international assistance, what the country needs the most is a ‘national 
consensus’ to ordinarily deal with the upcoming challenges beyond narrow party politics and 
a ‘constructive working relationship’ between government and the Maoist-led opposition 
pushing aside old mutual aversions. Repeating historical failures would lead to a total disaster 
in all spheres of state and society - economically, socially and politically - and even another 
armed confrontation cannot be ruled out. However, in order to create the environment for 
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change, all major political actors must understand the urgency of the situation as well as have 
the willingness to put partisan interests beside. Only then, a ‘national consensus’ and a 
‘constructive working relationship’ can be achieved. The earthquake could function as one of 
the most significant critical juncture in the country’s truncated political development. A 
positive sign in this direction is that there is growing awareness and sense of responsibility 
towards the Nepalese state and its people among the different political camps. A noteworthy 
indicator therefore is that the latest general strike, primarily organised by the Maoists, was 
withdrawn after an influential faction of the former insurgents (supported by the general 
public and business groups) intervened in order to stop this harmful shut-down of the 
economy and the public services. Concerning this, it will be interesting to monitor how far the 
suspension of a strike was a single happening or if it is a trendsetter within the Maoists 
political behaviour. 
 
Potential impacts of the earthquake on the national reconciliation process between the 
government and the Maoist movement 
Looking at the Maoists, in the first place we have to differentiate between the political and the 
military dimension of the Maoist movement in Nepal. Ultimately, there is always a concrete 
threat of an insurgency. After signing a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
November 2006 with the government, the former rebels came into power through elections in 
2008, after focusing on the political struggle and building up one of the largest political 
parties in Nepal (Communist Party of Nepal –Maoist/CPN-M, later known as Unified 
Communist Party of Nepal –Maoist). Nonetheless, they failed to establish a functioning 
government. The most important challenge for the Maoists was that the entrenched political 
forces rejected to work together with its former combatants. After they were forced out of 
office, but still having a significant role in the Constitutional Assembly, they tried in the 
recent years to implement their vision of a Nepal consisting of Federal States along ethnic 
lines. However, the current government opposed this vision vehemently. After witnessing the 
severe disappointments of the Maoists in the country’s politics, the rumour that they would re-
ignite their so called ‘people’s war’ is remarkably tenacious. To this end, one should also keep 
in mind the fact that the epicentre of the earthquake was located in the Northwest, not far 
from Kathmandu, in an area in which the Maoist insurgency (movement) had a significant 
support base and leverage during the last two decades. In this context, it is very worrisome 
that this part of Nepal feels extraordinarily neglected by the central government. However, it 
seems that even the Nepalese Maoists finally understand the economic-political changes in its 
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ideological paragon with China and they are discovering the ‘power of the purse’. Therefore, 
most of the former rebel leaders prefer to enjoy the benefits of being a stakeholder instead of 
being a destitute ‘anti-state actor’. Furthermore, after joining the peace and reconciliation 
process, many of the former Maoist fighters were absorbed into the regular armed forces. 
However, it is hard to assess if the Maoists still maintain armed militias in the country, and 
the nature of their willingness as well as their capacities to stage a new civil war. 
Nevertheless, it is most important to avoid anything, which could widen the divisions between 
the government and an opposition led by Maoists. If not, militant sections of the Maoists 
might rethink their decision to lay down their weapons in order to join the process of political-
reconciliation and democratic transition. But now with Nepal suffering from large scale 
damage, human losses and insufficient disaster management, the threat of politicised 
reconstruction programmes, the Maoists have an open road to stage a major political and 
peaceful comeback. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that since the end of the Maoist insurgency and the abolishment of the 
monarchy, Nepal’s democratic transition is stuck in a deep constitutional crisis and that it is 
hampered by numerous other unfortunate factors, like endemic corruption, frustrated political-
bureaucratic administration, incompetent, selfish politicians, non-functional political parties, 
and weak institutions. Instead of building a common ground for an effective institutional 
structure to strengthen the process of peace and national reconciliation, there was a slow but 
persistent weakening of the existing political-administrative framework. Furthermore, the last 
years were characterised by a deterioration of the quality of political leadership. Nevertheless 
there is also a great awareness among all major political actors that the political transition, 
which has been taking place, is not only far-reaching but also non-reversible, despite all 
hurdles originating from the challenges brought by the environment and human-based 
inadequacies. Today, the Nepalese people want to leave the old autocratic state behind, in 
order to embrace a totally new concept of Nepal; a democratic and federal one. But due to the 
social and political complexity of the country, the entire political transition process remains 
highly uncertain. At the moment, the major obstacles in contemporary Nepali politics are how 
to cope with the high expectations of the disappointed populace after the end of the civil wars, 
the growing frustration over the insufficient disaster management, the extraordinary tasks 
regarding managing the reconstruction process as well as how to ensure peace and political 
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stability. To handle these challenges, various changes in the mindset of the most crucial actors 
are essential:  
 
Firstly, the general public has to reduce its expectations as far as Realpolitik is concerned. In 
order to do so, the Nepali people have to accept the fact that the lack of functional political 
institutions and leadership skills will continue to hamper an immediate implementation of any 
far-reaching and large-scale social, economic and political reform programme. This cannot be 
changed overnight. Therefore, the common people and the political opposition need to find a 
balance between putting pressure on the government to improve their capacities and accepting 
gaps in good governance to maintain social-political harmony. Any political radicalisation of 
the people, resulting in destructive ways to express further dissatisfaction outside the 
parliamentary process, will pull the country into a deep crisis and anarchy. In this context one 
can argue, that after the breakdown of the country’s old political structures, the rupture of 
alliances between palace and pro-royalist traditional elites and institutions as well as the 
necessity to deal with the consequences of the 2015 Earthquake are opening a window of 
opportunity for new political coalitions. However, internalising the idea of consensus will also 
prove the will and capability of the Maoists to face the challenge of transforming themselves 
from an anti-system force into a stakeholder of a competitive, multi-party democracy.  
Secondly, the Maoists have to distance themselves from their extreme attitude in the 
formulation of demands and consequently in their decision-making process. This is a 
necessary condition in order to be able to build a consensus and to take part in the formation 
of political alliances as well as in coalition politics. Without the latter two elements (which 
must constitute core elements of the political culture in Nepal), neither the established 
political parties nor the Maoists will be able to bring about any noteworthy social and political 
change in the contemporary or future Nepal. 
Thirdly, the mainstream political parties have to overcome ‘dynastic rule’ and undergo major 
internal processes of democratisation. Additionally, they have to vanquish the deeply 
entrenched existing patrimonial political culture, in which the general interests were 
subordinated or ousted by particular interests of the ruling party elites and their networks.  
 
However, since Nepal’s elite is still hindered from functioning as a promoter for political 
change, one has to look for alternative engines to enhance the process of democratic 
transition. Having said this, the country’s biggest asset in the current crisis is the emergence 
of a strong civil society and a growing social capital since the introduction of multi-party 
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democracy. The civil society forces with the help of the international community have the 
ability to put Nepal on the right track towards recovery and political reconciliation. The 1934 
earthquake already showed that Nepal’s vibrant communities are able to successfully rebuild 
the country. In order to engage the country’s civil society even more, the government should 
create more opportunities for political participation of the people. In this direction, it would be 
of utmost importance to come to an agreement on a new constitution and to introduce local 
elections. Local elections have been suspended since the late 1990s, when the Maoist 
insurgency began, and every attempt to re-introduce them has lead to harsh political strife. 
The lack of elected local governments in Nepal’s 75 districts and roughly 4,000 villages and 
municipalities, has become acutely evident after the 2015 earthquake. Ultimately, it was civil 
society, which filled the gaps that were emerging due to the shortcomings of the national 
government in Kathmandu and the absence of elected representatives at the local level. In 
sum, the appearance of civil society as a significant factor in the political landscape will serve 
as a valuable resource to bring about change, especially towards the improvement of the 
country’s political culture. Only if there is immediate change and progress in the mindset of 
the leadership of all different political colours, Nepal’s fledgling democracy will not be able 
to stabilize and prosper.  
 
 
 
